Wednesday, August 5, 2020

Yemen's Multilayered War: Al Qaeda in Arab Peninsula

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Anant Jani

Article Title

Yemen's Multilayered War: Al Qaeda in Arab Peninsula

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Global Views 360

Publication Date

August 5, 2020

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Sailors render honors at the USS Cole Memorial

Sailors render honors at the USS Cole Memorial | Source: Flickr

This is the 4th part of a short explainer article series on the current crisis in Yemen. To read the earlier parts of the series click on the following links.

To read the 1st part of the series click on the link.

To read the 2nd part of the series click on the link.

To read the 3rd part of the series click on the link.

The unification of Yemen in 1990 was a direct result of the military defeat of South Yemen at the hand of North Yemen forces. This military defeat and coerced unification implied that Unified Yemen could not achieve real cohesion, preventing the functioning of the nation as a democratic unit.

Meanwhile, newer elements were added to the dangerous mix of sub-nationalism, intra religious division, and tribal loyalty in Yemen. These were the Yemeni veterans of Soviet-Afghan war who fought with the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet army backing the Afghan government.

These were hardline Wahabi and Salafi fighters, following an idealogy that mandated a strict interpretation of Islam. The fighters returned to Yemen in the early 1990s, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The local Yemeni, both the Zaidi Shias or Maliki Sunni have traditionally followed a more liberal version of Islamic and social practices. Unlike the local Sunnis who were living in peaceful coexistence with the Zaidis Shia, these hardliners were antagonistic to the Shias.

Their arrival was followed by a forceful realignment of the local residents’ religious practices, mandating the local population to strict interpretations and social practices. Osama bin Laden, who had family roots in Yemen, was a conveniently placed ideological mentor. This led to a pushback from both the government forces as well as Shia groups, especially the Houthi-led Ansar Allah movement. In time, these former mujahideen, who were battle hardened and well versed in guerilla warfare, allied themselves with Al-Qaeda to start a low level insurgency in Yemen.

The Gulf war and subsequent stationing of American forces in Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries provided another impetus for the growth of Al Qaeda in Yemen. Consequently, they demanded that coalition forces leave Arabian land, failing which would result in more terror attacks.

Al-Qaeda affiliated groups attacked many installations associated with the US-led coalition forces in Yemen and nearby countries. The most successful of those was the famous bombing of USS Cole in Aden, in 2000. It was followed by a series of attacks leading up to  9/11.

Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) is also known as the Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen is fighting to set up an emirate amidst the lack of leadership post the Houthi rebellion. It was this outfit that claimed responsibility for the attack on the French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, in 2015 and is now considered the most dangerous al-Qaeda outfit by the US.

The CNN reported that “AQAP set out its objectives in a May 2010 statement as the "expulsion of Jews and crusaders" from the Arabian Peninsula, the re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate, the introduction of Sharia, or Islamic law, and the liberation of Muslim lands.”

The full list of attacks and places captured by terrorist insurgents in chronological order can be accessed here.

One of the outcomes of continual terrorist attacks has been a reduction in Hadi’s popularity. He is also seen as weak for not being able to stop al-Qaeda from terrorising Southern Yemen, as well as for not being able to alleviate them from their feeling of marginalization ever since the unification.

To read the 5th part of the series click on the link.

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February 4, 2021 4:39 PM

US Sanctions versus Iran’s fight against COVID-19 pandemic

Iran is the hardest-hit country by the coronavirus pandemic in the middle east. The contagion was first detected on 19 February 2020 in the holy city of Qom, and thereafter spread quickly across the country. As of 18th June 2020, it had over 9000 coronavirus related fatalities. The virus attacked all the 31 provinces of the country not discriminating between the common man and the people at high places including the members of the Parliament, religious leaders and senior ministers. The crisis touched most parts of the country, but it most severely impacted working and the poor class. 

The Iranian government has been criticized for its response towards the pandemic. The health care policy, which has been politicized, has preferred denial and misinformation as a response to the crisis the pandemic brought with it. Questions have also been raised about the role of US sanctions in crippling Iran’s economy, public health facilities and public health facilities. All these factors, when combined, have disabled Tehran (the capital of Iran) from providing the best response to the pandemic. 

What do the sanction laws say?

According to the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the US has “consistently maintained broad exceptions and authorizations to support humanitarian transactions with Iran.” The first significant sanctions were imposed in 1995 by Bill Clinton, and in 2001 exemptions for medical goods and medicine first came into effect. These sanctions have periodically widened the scope of products for exemption, and by 2012, the exclusions included agricultural products and most foods. After the world powers, including the US, reached a deal with Iran on its nuclear programme in 2015, the sanctions were lowered against Iran. This approach was abandoned after Trump withdrew the US from the deal and sought to force Iran’s leaders to change their anti-US policy. .

The US sanctions are enforced through a wide array of instruments. Financial sanctions prohibit US banks from transacting with Iran, which limits Iran’s access to dollar-denominated transactions. Secondary sanctions measures also target non-US entities that have dealings with Iran, thus at a risk of facing prosecution in the US. These sanctions make transactions with Iran lengthy and complicated, and even impossible in some cases

There are some exemptions from sanctions for humanitarian assistance (sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine and agricultural services). Despite these exemptions, sanctions have severely impaired Iran’s ability to be able to finance humanitarian imports. Given the volume of complexity and due diligence involved, most banks are reluctant to deal with Iran. This makes it difficult to find a way to pay for purchases difficult for Iran. Also many items require additional authorization because the US considers them as “dual-use” (the things might also be used for defence- for example, the sort of oxygen generators that are needed in life support machines used to treat coronavirus cases). Lastly, the sanctions on Iran’s oil exports led to a decline in revenue, further weakening Iran’s currency, which has left the country vulnerable and with fewer resources to pay for non-sanctioned items as well. 

All these put together have directly caused shortages of medical equipment and impacted Iran’s health sector negatively. This has also impacted the capability of Iranian healthcare sector to effectively manage the COVID-19 situation.

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