Friday, October 16, 2020

India’s neighbours drifting towards China: Has PM Modi’s “Neighbourhood First” policy failed?

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Syed Ahmed Uzair

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India’s neighbours drifting towards China: Has PM Modi’s “Neighbourhood First” policy failed?

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Global Views 360

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October 16, 2020

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi in a 2014 SAARC Meeting

Prime Minister Narendra Modi in a 2014 SAARC Meeting | Source: Wikimedia

Back in 2014, when BJP came to power in India under the leadership of Narendra Modi, he invited the heads of government from Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Maldives, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka to his swearing-in ceremony at the Rashtrapati Bhavan.­ The move set the tone nicely for Modi’s “Neighbourhood First” foreign policy and was hailed by experts and critics alike as a positive step towards bolstering regional connectivity and improving cross border relations. Cut to 2020, and the ongoing China-India conflict has exposed plenty of problems for New Delhi regarding its relations with its neighbouring countries, particularly, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal.

In recent days China has increased its investments in Asia and beyond even as India and the West have watched from close quarters. Most of the investments have revolved around Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road (BRI) Initiative , which aims to create a Sino-centric global trading network and sphere of influence. The BRI initiative is a matter of concern particularly for India because of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that is perhaps the most important project under the BRI initiative.

India has, traditionally, played a dominant role in economic and political matters concerning most of its smaller neighbours. However, with the BRI initiative, China gradually built up its political ties with countries such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, while India’s relations with these countries have become less cordial in recent years. Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, who were once considered allies to India appear to have tilted in favour of China.

The changing nature of India’s and China's relation with India’s neighbouring countries was evident in the silence of these countries when there was a serious flare-up on the India-China border. It is important to note that every South-Asian nation except Bhutan has signed on to China’s BRI. Bhutan is still following India’s lead in not joining BRI due to its own border dispute with China, for which India’s support is essential.

Nepalese Prime Minister KP Oli with PM Modi | Source: Wikimedia

Nepalese PM KP Oli had called Indian PM Narendra Modi, on 15th August, India’s seventy-third Independence anniversary. A statement by India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated, “‘The leaders expressed mutual solidarity in the context of the efforts being made to minimise the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic in both countries.” However, in June 2020, the Nepalese Armed Police Force fired upon a group of Indian citizens at the India-Nepal border, killing one person and injuring two others. A third Indian who had been detained was released later. The move came in the aftermath of the Nepalese Parliament declaring the Indian territories of Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh and Kalapani as a part of Nepal.

Historically, India and Bangladesh have maintained close ties with each other. Modi’s rise to power in 2014 had no effect as Bangladesh’s PM Sheikh Hasina continued to maintain relations with India. In June 2015, when Modi visited Bangladesh 22 bilateral agreements were signed, including the resolution to a border issue that had existed since 1947 through a successful land boundary agreement (LBA). India also pledged $5 billion worth of investments in Bangladesh. When Sheikh Hasina visited New Delhi in April 2017, a civil nuclear tripartite pact was signed between India, Russia, and Bangladesh. Under the pact India will play an important role in establishing a nuclear power plant in Bangladesh. Even as late as March 2019, Narendra Modi had launched four projects in Bangladesh.

PM Modi, during a meeting with Bangladeshi PM Sheikh Hasina donates the steering wheel of INS Vikrant (R11) to the Bangladesh War Museum | Source: Wikimedia

However, India’s relationship with Bangladesh turned sour post August 2019, when the BJP government implemented the NRC in Assam, a north-eastern Indian state. The process of NRC was meant to identify illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. The 1.9 million people left out in the Assam NRC were a cause of concern for Bangladesh owing to the fear of a sudden influx of people forced out of the Indian state. Bangladesh thus turned to China under its “look East” policy in a bid to reduce its dependence on India. China replaced India to become the top trade partner of Bangladesh in 2015 and has provided assistance to Bangladesh through the BRI via 27 agreements signed on Xi Jinping’s visit to the nation in 2016.

“China is behaving how emerging superpowers generally tend to behave—they try to flex muscles and project power—all of which China is trying to do at the moment," says Happymon Jacob, associate professor of disarmament studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). “When that happens, states around that emerging power will either stand up against it (like India) or jump on the bandwagon (like other smaller south Asian countries)."

While China continues to make rapid strides, India is left to wonder as to how to deal with this apparent crisis surrounding its neighbouring countries. Modi’s neighbourhood first policy has certainly failed to deliver the promises it made and relations with most neighbouring countries have worsened over the past six years. New Delhi has missed out on several economic gains that would have strengthened ties with neighbouring countries and thereby would have helped to counter the growing Chinese influence in the region. It remains to be seen as to how India decides to get over this tricky situation and improves its ties with its neighbouring countries.

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February 4, 2021 4:57 PM

India’s Transgender (Protection of Rights) Act: Why the activists are opposing it?

On July 13, 2020 the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment of India notified the release of draft Rules for the much-disputed Transgender (Protection of Rights) Act 2019, and has given citizens 30 days to submit suggestions and objections.

The Ministry first published the draft Rules on April 18, 2020 and asked for comments by April 30, later extended to May 18. Based on the central government’s consideration of the submitted feedback, the updated Rules were once again opened to critique.

As summarised in this analysis by PRS Legislative Research, the Rules lay out the detailed process regarding issuance of Certificate of Identity, and welfare measures, medical facilities and such for transgender people. It also specifies that the National Institute of Social Defence will act as secretariat for the National Council for Transgender Persons.

Analysis

  1. The Act is infamous for claiming to confer the right to self-perceived gender identity, which is also enshrined in the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) vs. Union of India judgement, but continuously neglecting this right thereby going against both a Supreme Court judgement and its own statement.
  2. This manifested once again in Rule 4 of the first draft of Rules which required a psychologist’s report— while paradoxically insisting that it requires “no medical examination”— as part of the application process. This requirement was removed from the recent draft of the Rules after backlash.
  3. Also, as stated in the Act, it is the District Magistrate who will determine the final “correctness” of the application, essentially stripping transgender people of any supposed right to self determination. It is worth noting that this places the District Magistrate, an executive figure, in a judicial position, one of ‘judging’ the ‘authenticity’ of a person’s gender identity.
  4. The above mentioned application will only provide a Certificate of Identity that states a person’s gender identity as transgender. To be able to apply for a revised Certificate of Identity to change one’s gender to male/female as per Rule 6, a person must undergo gender reassignment surgery and on top of that provide a certificate stating this from the Medical Superintendent or Chief Medical Officer from the medical institution which facilitates the surgery.
  5. This is problematic for a large multitude of reasons, including but not limited to: many transgender people not feeling the need for medical or surgical intervention, the policing of transgender people’s identity as only being ‘valid’ if they undergo surgery, and the sky-high costs of surgery contrasted with large numbers of transgender people living in unsupportive environments and/or being unable to finance their surgery.
  6. The right to self-identification continues to be blatantly violated in Rule 8, under which a District Magistrate can reject an application, following which the applicant has a right to appeal the rejection only within 60 days of intimation of the same, as stated in Rule 9.
  7. The right to self-determination was also thrown out the window when the first draft Rules imposed a penalty on “false” applications, once again referring to the arbitrary power of the District Magistrate. This has also been removed following strongly negative reactions.

It is important to compare the two versions of the Rules despite the second one being arguably better and cognizant of some of the demands made by the citizens and other stakeholders.

The first version of the Rules quite clearly depicted the narrowly cisnormative perspective through which transgender lives are seen by the people in power. Despite the many changes as a result of relentless protests, the Act is nowhere near to truly respecting and empowering transgender people.

The decision to give the final say to the District Magistrate- which some argue made the process harder than it used to be before the Act- and the refusal to provide affirmative action or reservations to ensure representation in positions of authority that transgender people have historically been denied access to.

It also does little to counter discrimination, as is seen most clearly in the punishment of sexual assault and rape being much less than for the rape of a cisgender woman. It advocates for plenty of measures but does pitifully little to ensure or enable these changes.  

History of the Act

The history of the Act is a turbulent one. The 2016 Transgender (Protection of Rights) Bill, was almost immediately slammed by activists, NGOs, other human rights organisations, and citizens, for multiple reasons.

The most derided was the provision to set up a ‘District Screening Committee’ which included the District Magistrate, a chief medical officer and a psychiatrist among others, for the sole purpose of scrutinising a transgender person’s body and identity. It also criminalised organised begging, an activity specifically common among the Hijra community.

The Lower House of the Parliament, the Lok Sabha, rejected all the proposed changes by the parliamentary standing committee along with the demands of the transgender community, and passed the bill with some amendments in 2018. A short-lived victory came in the form of the lapse of the bill due to the 2019 general elections.

However, as soon as the NDA government was re-elected, the bill was reintroduced in the Parliament with some more changes, particularly the removal of the section on District Screening Committees, but was still unsatisfactory.

The full text of this bill was not released when it was approved by the Union Cabinet on July 10, 2019, but on the morning that it was tabled in the Lok Sabha, garnering another consecutive year of protest since it was first introduced.

This is the bill as it exists today, having been passed by the Lok Sabha on August 5, 2019. When the motion to refer it to a select committee failed in the Rajya Sabha, it was passed on November 26, 2019, and received presidential assent on December 5, 2019. Recent developments include a writ petition in the Supreme Court challenging the validity of the Act.

Despite it becoming the law of the land, transgender citizens and activists such as Esvi Anbu Kothazam and Kanmani Ray continue to criticse it and the insidious transphobic thinking that has always guided it.

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