Thursday, March 4, 2021

Are India's Antitrust laws effective at controlling monopolies?

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Vaishnavi Krishna Mohan

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Are India's Antitrust laws effective at controlling monopolies?

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Global Views 360

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March 4, 2021

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Representative Image for rise of Monopolies

Representative Image for rise of Monopolies

On 15th of July 2020, Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL) held its annual general meeting of the shareholders. The chairman and managing director Mukesh Ambani, announced that global tech giant Google would be investing $4.5 billion in Jio Platforms. Facebook also has acquired a 9.99% stake in Jio Platforms. This is the first time in the world that both the global tech giants have invested in the same entity. These investments have boosted the confidence for Jio Platforms and also for India’s growth but there have been questions and speculations about the potential anti-competitive makeup of these deals.

The objective of this article is to explore the interpretation and the effectuality of Antitrust laws in India.

Anti-competitive practices are those business practices which firms engage in to emerge as the or one of the few dominant firms, who will then be able to restrict inter firm competition in the industry in a bid to preserve their dominant status. The Collins English dictionary defines antitrust laws as those laws that are intended to stop large firms taking over their competitors by fixing prices with their competitors, or interfering with free competition in any way. These laws focus on protecting consumer interests and promoting a competitive market. The word ‘Antitrust’ is derived from the word ‘trust’. A trust was an agreement by which stakeholders in several companies transferred their shares to a single set of trustees.

In present-day India, talking about market dominance Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL), resembles American company—John D Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company—of the early 20th century. Mukesh Ambani holds the highest ability to influence markets and policy in every sector in which RIL is present—petrochemicals, oil, telecom, and retail. Many industry experts and critics suggest that Ambani has used his political clout to twist the regulatory framework in his favor.

Gautam Adani, founder of Adani Group | Source: Twitter

Furthermore, economic power in aviation infrastructure is clustering into a few hands as well. In 2019, the Adani Group bagged the 50-year concession to operate all the six Airports Authority of India-operated airports—Lucknow, Jaipur, Guwahati, Ahmedabad, Trivandrum, and Mangaluru—which were put up for auction. The company also obtained a controlling stake in ‘The Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj International Airport, Mumbai’ from GVK Airports. Moreover, Adani Group is now set to construct the Navi Mumbai International Airport. The group is now eyeing Indian Railways while they have already established an alarming monopoly in green energy and sea ports. While Airports are natural monopolies, one private company controlling more than 8 important airports is not good news to airlines.

India has established antitrust laws to promote competition. For 40 years, India followed the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969 (MRTP). This act was based on principles of import substitution and a command-and-control economy. However, over time several amendments had to be made to the act. In 2002, the Indian approved a new comprehensive competition legislation. This is called the Competition Act 2002. The act focused on regulating business practices in order to prevent practices having an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in India. The act primarily regulates three types of conduct: anti-competitive agreements (vertical and horizontal agreements), abuse of a dominant position, and combinations such as mergers and acquisitions. The act lists out the cartel agreements that it intends to prevent. This list includes price-fixing agreements, agreements between competitors seeking to limit or control production, market-sharing agreements between competitors and bid-rigging agreements. These agreements are called “cartel” arrangements.

The competition Act is enacted by the Competition Commission of India (CCI), which is exclusively responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Act. It comprises a team of 2 to 6 people appointed by the government of India. The CCI has previously handled high-profile cases. In 2018, CCI imposed a fine of Rs135.86 crore on Google on the grounds that Google misused its dominant position and powers to create a search bias. In another important case, the CCI, ordered a probe into Idea, Vodafone and Airtel when Reliance Jio owner Mukesh Ambani lodged a complaint against the three for forming a cartel and denying Jio the POI required for network connection, causing multiple call failures. The Cellular Operator Association of India was also probed for encouraging the same.

In some cases, the Competition Commission has been successful in tackling activities that are against the free competitive market. However, critics and economists believe that the act is now unable to adapt to the changing business environment in e-commerce, telecom, technology and the government’s role in distorting competition. Demonetization and GST drove the formalization of the economy. One consequence of them was that bigger, better organized players gained at the cost of smaller ones with lesser resources. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was designed to solve the problem of non-performing assets (NPAs) of banks. But consequentially, it has also led to a consolidation in many sectors.  

However, CCI has expressed inability to consistently adjudicate punitive measures due to obligation in several cases. This points to the loopholes in the very provisions of the Competition Act 2002. In an Economic and Political Weekly (EPW) article, Aditya Bhattacharjea—an Economist—argues that even though the 2002 Act represents an improvement from the MRTP Act which was extremely restrictive, the present act also remains riddled with loopholes and ambiguities. According to Bhattacharjea, this creates unnecessary legal uncertainty, which acts in advantage of lawyers and law firms. For instance, the act allows the CCI to leave some scope of flexibility for “relative advantage, by way of contribution to the economic development.” Bhattacharjea argues that this may allow large firms to justify their anti-competitive practices in the name of development.

Mark Zuckerberg and Mukesh Ambani having online interaction after Facebook invested in Jio Platforms | Source: NDTV

Data portability plays a significant role in determining market power of certain firms. In 2017, the CCI closed cases against both WhatsApp and Jio involving allegations of predatory pricing and privacy violations. In both these decisions, the regulator did not consider the restrictions around data portability as a competitive advantage. The possible data leveraging advantage for the attempted monopolization could be the ‘portfolio effect’. Portfolio effect refers to increasing the range of brands, by bundling of telecom or messaging service and other service offerings or illegal vertical restraints, even predatory pricing. This in turn may lead to greater ability of further leveraging, deterring innovation and results in degradation of quality. Another possible advantage is explained as the theory of leveraging. The best example of leveraging is when Microsoft entered the media-player market by extending its quasi-monopoly on the operating systems market by taking advantage of the indirect network effects. In case of Facebook acquiring 10% of Jio’s shares, it is a concern that both entities could potentially use WhatsApp’s market dominance in telecom and social networking services and establish dominance in e-commerce market through anticompetitive acts.

There was a consensus among Indian policymakers at the time of the 1991 economic reforms that economic liberalization would eliminate the nexus between the business elites and the policymakers. On the contrary, the relationship between these two groups got further strengthened.

On the other hand, few critics and industrialists argue that extreme restrictions on growing companies hampers the progressive growth of the national economy. While RIL’s Jio looks like a cause for concern, the company has also saved Rs. 60,000 crores for annual savings in India. In addition to that, the entry of Jio to the telecom industry has led to a rise in data consumption and improved accessibility and affordability of the internet across the nation.

However, the concern still lingers as the question of whether this growth is a result of actual innovation or crony capitalism remains unsolved.

However, the fact that telecom, organized retail, ports and airports have two or three players controlling the bulk of the sector needs to be addressed. A healthy competition is quintessential for long-term growth and innovation. Harmful trade practices and cartelization does not only affect small manufacturers but also the general public.

The government, CCI and other lawmakers must closely examine the present laws and provisions and need to see if they are required to amend the act.

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February 4, 2021 4:57 PM

India’s Transgender (Protection of Rights) Act: Why the activists are opposing it?

On July 13, 2020 the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment of India notified the release of draft Rules for the much-disputed Transgender (Protection of Rights) Act 2019, and has given citizens 30 days to submit suggestions and objections.

The Ministry first published the draft Rules on April 18, 2020 and asked for comments by April 30, later extended to May 18. Based on the central government’s consideration of the submitted feedback, the updated Rules were once again opened to critique.

As summarised in this analysis by PRS Legislative Research, the Rules lay out the detailed process regarding issuance of Certificate of Identity, and welfare measures, medical facilities and such for transgender people. It also specifies that the National Institute of Social Defence will act as secretariat for the National Council for Transgender Persons.

Analysis

  1. The Act is infamous for claiming to confer the right to self-perceived gender identity, which is also enshrined in the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) vs. Union of India judgement, but continuously neglecting this right thereby going against both a Supreme Court judgement and its own statement.
  2. This manifested once again in Rule 4 of the first draft of Rules which required a psychologist’s report— while paradoxically insisting that it requires “no medical examination”— as part of the application process. This requirement was removed from the recent draft of the Rules after backlash.
  3. Also, as stated in the Act, it is the District Magistrate who will determine the final “correctness” of the application, essentially stripping transgender people of any supposed right to self determination. It is worth noting that this places the District Magistrate, an executive figure, in a judicial position, one of ‘judging’ the ‘authenticity’ of a person’s gender identity.
  4. The above mentioned application will only provide a Certificate of Identity that states a person’s gender identity as transgender. To be able to apply for a revised Certificate of Identity to change one’s gender to male/female as per Rule 6, a person must undergo gender reassignment surgery and on top of that provide a certificate stating this from the Medical Superintendent or Chief Medical Officer from the medical institution which facilitates the surgery.
  5. This is problematic for a large multitude of reasons, including but not limited to: many transgender people not feeling the need for medical or surgical intervention, the policing of transgender people’s identity as only being ‘valid’ if they undergo surgery, and the sky-high costs of surgery contrasted with large numbers of transgender people living in unsupportive environments and/or being unable to finance their surgery.
  6. The right to self-identification continues to be blatantly violated in Rule 8, under which a District Magistrate can reject an application, following which the applicant has a right to appeal the rejection only within 60 days of intimation of the same, as stated in Rule 9.
  7. The right to self-determination was also thrown out the window when the first draft Rules imposed a penalty on “false” applications, once again referring to the arbitrary power of the District Magistrate. This has also been removed following strongly negative reactions.

It is important to compare the two versions of the Rules despite the second one being arguably better and cognizant of some of the demands made by the citizens and other stakeholders.

The first version of the Rules quite clearly depicted the narrowly cisnormative perspective through which transgender lives are seen by the people in power. Despite the many changes as a result of relentless protests, the Act is nowhere near to truly respecting and empowering transgender people.

The decision to give the final say to the District Magistrate- which some argue made the process harder than it used to be before the Act- and the refusal to provide affirmative action or reservations to ensure representation in positions of authority that transgender people have historically been denied access to.

It also does little to counter discrimination, as is seen most clearly in the punishment of sexual assault and rape being much less than for the rape of a cisgender woman. It advocates for plenty of measures but does pitifully little to ensure or enable these changes.  

History of the Act

The history of the Act is a turbulent one. The 2016 Transgender (Protection of Rights) Bill, was almost immediately slammed by activists, NGOs, other human rights organisations, and citizens, for multiple reasons.

The most derided was the provision to set up a ‘District Screening Committee’ which included the District Magistrate, a chief medical officer and a psychiatrist among others, for the sole purpose of scrutinising a transgender person’s body and identity. It also criminalised organised begging, an activity specifically common among the Hijra community.

The Lower House of the Parliament, the Lok Sabha, rejected all the proposed changes by the parliamentary standing committee along with the demands of the transgender community, and passed the bill with some amendments in 2018. A short-lived victory came in the form of the lapse of the bill due to the 2019 general elections.

However, as soon as the NDA government was re-elected, the bill was reintroduced in the Parliament with some more changes, particularly the removal of the section on District Screening Committees, but was still unsatisfactory.

The full text of this bill was not released when it was approved by the Union Cabinet on July 10, 2019, but on the morning that it was tabled in the Lok Sabha, garnering another consecutive year of protest since it was first introduced.

This is the bill as it exists today, having been passed by the Lok Sabha on August 5, 2019. When the motion to refer it to a select committee failed in the Rajya Sabha, it was passed on November 26, 2019, and received presidential assent on December 5, 2019. Recent developments include a writ petition in the Supreme Court challenging the validity of the Act.

Despite it becoming the law of the land, transgender citizens and activists such as Esvi Anbu Kothazam and Kanmani Ray continue to criticse it and the insidious transphobic thinking that has always guided it.

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