Sunday, July 26, 2020

A Timeline of Political Instability in the Indian state of Rajasthan

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Vanshita Banuana

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A Timeline of Political Instability in the Indian state of Rajasthan

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Global Views 360

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July 26, 2020

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Sachin Pilot and Ashok Gehlot after Victory in Rajasthan Elections

Sachin Pilot and Ashok Gehlot after Victory in  Rajasthan Elections | Source: Dushyant Singh via Flickr

A recent political crisis in the Indian state of Rajasthan has brought with it a storm of internal instability. Perhaps the biggest question on the mind of most political analysts and politicians, amidst this, is the anticipation—or hope— that Sachin Pilot, ex-Deputy Chief Minister of Chief Minister in Rajasthan, will announce his departure from the Indian National Congress (INC) and join the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The central BJP government has garnered quite a reputation for toppling state governments in regions where the oppositional party Congress forms the majority.

But focusing on the BJP might be taking everyone’s eyes away from the big picture: a story that is, for now, about more than possible BJP interference. Consider what the crisis tells the citizens of India about Congress’ national and state level handling of ‘political drama,’ as the series of events continue to unfold.

July 10, 2020: Pilot is summoned by the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Rajasthan Police in regards to an FIR registered against him on an alleged attempt to dislodge the Gehlot government in recent Rajya Sabha polls through horse-trading; however, the root of discord may have been sown long before that.

July 11, 2020: The Chief Minister (CM), Ashok Gehlot claims the BJP is trying to overturn his government by bribing MLAs.

July 12, 2020: The Dy Chief Minister, Sachin Pilot claims 30 MLAs have ‘pledged support’ to him, making the present government a minority. Ashok Gehlot responds by claiming it has 109 MLAs; Pilot seen with BJP leader Jyotiraditya Scindia in Delhi as he and his supporters move in and around Delhi and Gurgaon.

July 13, 2020: INC issues whip for Congress Legislature Party (CLP) meeting at CM’s residence where it passes a resolution to support Gehlot and take disciplinary action against MLAs and office-bearers who ‘weakens party’; Congress also says that ‘doors will remain open’ for Pilot and his aides; Pilot does not attend the meeting, and those who do are transported to Fairmont Hotel in Jaipur to avoid any ‘potential crossover.’

July 14, 2020: INC calls for a second CLP meet, which is once again not attended by Pilot; Pilot is removed from his positions as the Deputy Chief Minister and President of State Congress Committee of Rajasthan, along with 18 other MLAs who supported him; a plea is filed in Rajasthan High Court against the disqualification notices; 2 MLAs from Bhartiya Tribal Party (BTP) withdraw support from Congress, but hand over letters of support to Ghelot four days later on July 18; the BJP demands a floor test, but later denies this claim.

July 15, 2020: Pilot confirms he is not planning to join the BJP.

July 16: News of leaked audio tapes start surfacing, reportedly proving a conspiracy to topple the Gehlot government; FIRs are lodged.

July 17, 2020: Harish Salve, representative of ‘Pilot camp’ in Rajasthan HC, argues that the rebel MLAs have not resigned, yet they were issued disqualification notices under Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule, which is only applicable in case of resignation; 2 rebel MLAs are suspended by Congress over their alleged involvement in leaked audio tapes; an arrest is made by SOG in regards to horse-trading probe and leaked audio tapes.

July 18, 2020: BJP levels allegations of phone tapping and demands Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) probe in relation to leaked audio tapes; two days later the Rajasthan Government notifies via circular that it has revoked general consent to CBI that is needed for investigations, and consent will now be sought on a case by case basis.

July 19, 2020: SOG reaches Manesar to question one of the rebel MLAs claimed to be named in leaked audio tapes; Gehlot forms probe to investigate audio tapes.

July 20, 2020: Giriraj Singh Malinga, a Rajasthan MLA from INC, claims that he was offered Rs. 35 crore by Pilot to join the BJP, Pilot responds by saying he is ‘sad but not surprised’ at what he considers to be fabrications intended to damage his reputation; Ghelot remains convinced that Pilot is ‘hand in glove’ with the BJP; meanwhile in Rajasthan High Court, the judges observe that a whip cannot be issued with respect to a party meeting, but only for an Assembly session.

July 21, 2020: Hearing of petition ends, Rajasthan High Court says it will announce the verdict on July 24 and the Speaker cannot act on the disqualification notices until then; Third Congress Legislature Party begins at Fairmont Hotel.

July 22, 2020: Rajasthan Speaker CP Joshi moves Supreme Court in order to challenge the stay order of the High Court.

July 23, 2020: SC allows Rajasthan HC to continue passing orders as scheduled; says it will begin hearing the Speaker’s plea from July 27.

July 24, 2020: Rajasthan HC orders that a “status quo” be maintained and defers its judgement until SC makes a decision; Speaker will not be allowed to act on disqualification notice until both courts pronounce their verdicts; Rajasthan HC allows the Union of India to be made a party in the case; ‘Gehlot’s camp’ organise a dharna at Raj Bhawan demanding an Assembly session, and Gehlot meets Governor Kalraj Mishra regarding the same.

As the situation gets more complex and drawn-out, the question of the BJP government’s involvement is still up in the air. The crisis currently presents itself as a mishandling on Congress' part at the state and national level, perhaps stemming from younger leaders not seeing eye-to-eye with the veterans.

The insatiable hunger for power by any means displayed by the BJP- despite its claims of non-involvement- in seeing the current government toppled cannot and should not be overlooked. Speculations run abound, and at the end of the day it might just be up to the citizens to peer through the fog and infer for themselves the roles and intentions of the embroiled parties.

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April 13, 2021 7:47 AM

Are India's Antitrust laws effective at controlling monopolies?

On 15th of July 2020, Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL) held its annual general meeting of the shareholders. The chairman and managing director Mukesh Ambani, announced that global tech giant Google would be investing $4.5 billion in Jio Platforms. Facebook also has acquired a 9.99% stake in Jio Platforms. This is the first time in the world that both the global tech giants have invested in the same entity. These investments have boosted the confidence for Jio Platforms and also for India’s growth but there have been questions and speculations about the potential anti-competitive makeup of these deals.

The objective of this article is to explore the interpretation and the effectuality of Antitrust laws in India.

Anti-competitive practices are those business practices which firms engage in to emerge as the or one of the few dominant firms, who will then be able to restrict inter firm competition in the industry in a bid to preserve their dominant status. The Collins English dictionary defines antitrust laws as those laws that are intended to stop large firms taking over their competitors by fixing prices with their competitors, or interfering with free competition in any way. These laws focus on protecting consumer interests and promoting a competitive market. The word ‘Antitrust’ is derived from the word ‘trust’. A trust was an agreement by which stakeholders in several companies transferred their shares to a single set of trustees.

In present-day India, talking about market dominance Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL), resembles American company—John D Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company—of the early 20th century. Mukesh Ambani holds the highest ability to influence markets and policy in every sector in which RIL is present—petrochemicals, oil, telecom, and retail. Many industry experts and critics suggest that Ambani has used his political clout to twist the regulatory framework in his favor.

Gautam Adani, founder of Adani Group | Source: Twitter

Furthermore, economic power in aviation infrastructure is clustering into a few hands as well. In 2019, the Adani Group bagged the 50-year concession to operate all the six Airports Authority of India-operated airports—Lucknow, Jaipur, Guwahati, Ahmedabad, Trivandrum, and Mangaluru—which were put up for auction. The company also obtained a controlling stake in ‘The Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj International Airport, Mumbai’ from GVK Airports. Moreover, Adani Group is now set to construct the Navi Mumbai International Airport. The group is now eyeing Indian Railways while they have already established an alarming monopoly in green energy and sea ports. While Airports are natural monopolies, one private company controlling more than 8 important airports is not good news to airlines.

India has established antitrust laws to promote competition. For 40 years, India followed the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969 (MRTP). This act was based on principles of import substitution and a command-and-control economy. However, over time several amendments had to be made to the act. In 2002, the Indian approved a new comprehensive competition legislation. This is called the Competition Act 2002. The act focused on regulating business practices in order to prevent practices having an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in India. The act primarily regulates three types of conduct: anti-competitive agreements (vertical and horizontal agreements), abuse of a dominant position, and combinations such as mergers and acquisitions. The act lists out the cartel agreements that it intends to prevent. This list includes price-fixing agreements, agreements between competitors seeking to limit or control production, market-sharing agreements between competitors and bid-rigging agreements. These agreements are called “cartel” arrangements.

The competition Act is enacted by the Competition Commission of India (CCI), which is exclusively responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Act. It comprises a team of 2 to 6 people appointed by the government of India. The CCI has previously handled high-profile cases. In 2018, CCI imposed a fine of Rs135.86 crore on Google on the grounds that Google misused its dominant position and powers to create a search bias. In another important case, the CCI, ordered a probe into Idea, Vodafone and Airtel when Reliance Jio owner Mukesh Ambani lodged a complaint against the three for forming a cartel and denying Jio the POI required for network connection, causing multiple call failures. The Cellular Operator Association of India was also probed for encouraging the same.

In some cases, the Competition Commission has been successful in tackling activities that are against the free competitive market. However, critics and economists believe that the act is now unable to adapt to the changing business environment in e-commerce, telecom, technology and the government’s role in distorting competition. Demonetization and GST drove the formalization of the economy. One consequence of them was that bigger, better organized players gained at the cost of smaller ones with lesser resources. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was designed to solve the problem of non-performing assets (NPAs) of banks. But consequentially, it has also led to a consolidation in many sectors.  

However, CCI has expressed inability to consistently adjudicate punitive measures due to obligation in several cases. This points to the loopholes in the very provisions of the Competition Act 2002. In an Economic and Political Weekly (EPW) article, Aditya Bhattacharjea—an Economist—argues that even though the 2002 Act represents an improvement from the MRTP Act which was extremely restrictive, the present act also remains riddled with loopholes and ambiguities. According to Bhattacharjea, this creates unnecessary legal uncertainty, which acts in advantage of lawyers and law firms. For instance, the act allows the CCI to leave some scope of flexibility for “relative advantage, by way of contribution to the economic development.” Bhattacharjea argues that this may allow large firms to justify their anti-competitive practices in the name of development.

Mark Zuckerberg and Mukesh Ambani having online interaction after Facebook invested in Jio Platforms | Source: NDTV

Data portability plays a significant role in determining market power of certain firms. In 2017, the CCI closed cases against both WhatsApp and Jio involving allegations of predatory pricing and privacy violations. In both these decisions, the regulator did not consider the restrictions around data portability as a competitive advantage. The possible data leveraging advantage for the attempted monopolization could be the ‘portfolio effect’. Portfolio effect refers to increasing the range of brands, by bundling of telecom or messaging service and other service offerings or illegal vertical restraints, even predatory pricing. This in turn may lead to greater ability of further leveraging, deterring innovation and results in degradation of quality. Another possible advantage is explained as the theory of leveraging. The best example of leveraging is when Microsoft entered the media-player market by extending its quasi-monopoly on the operating systems market by taking advantage of the indirect network effects. In case of Facebook acquiring 10% of Jio’s shares, it is a concern that both entities could potentially use WhatsApp’s market dominance in telecom and social networking services and establish dominance in e-commerce market through anticompetitive acts.

There was a consensus among Indian policymakers at the time of the 1991 economic reforms that economic liberalization would eliminate the nexus between the business elites and the policymakers. On the contrary, the relationship between these two groups got further strengthened.

On the other hand, few critics and industrialists argue that extreme restrictions on growing companies hampers the progressive growth of the national economy. While RIL’s Jio looks like a cause for concern, the company has also saved Rs. 60,000 crores for annual savings in India. In addition to that, the entry of Jio to the telecom industry has led to a rise in data consumption and improved accessibility and affordability of the internet across the nation.

However, the concern still lingers as the question of whether this growth is a result of actual innovation or crony capitalism remains unsolved.

However, the fact that telecom, organized retail, ports and airports have two or three players controlling the bulk of the sector needs to be addressed. A healthy competition is quintessential for long-term growth and innovation. Harmful trade practices and cartelization does not only affect small manufacturers but also the general public.

The government, CCI and other lawmakers must closely examine the present laws and provisions and need to see if they are required to amend the act.

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